If Russia could not defeat Ukraine militarily, it would target its adversary’s economy by blockading its foreign trade. Until they did, they could take solace in the fact that as long as they continued to patrol Ukraine’s Black Sea coast, the country’s most important harbor could not function.Įven then, in the war’s early months, Moscow’s plan was becoming clear. In the distance, bobbing just over the horizon, Russian warships were poised to strike. Where once I could walk freely along the city’s shoreline, I saw concrete slabs and sandbags and twitchy soldiers eager to stop me from taking photos of anything that they-often arbitrarily-deemed sensitive. Kyiv’s army was holding up Russian troops outside the city of Mykolaiv, about 70 miles to the east. The fighting nearby, in the south of the country, was fierce. When I was in Odesa in late April, Ukraine’s most important Black Sea port was already ringed with mines and steel. Anticipating a looming world food crisis, Moscow has coordinated its media outlets and social-media accounts to spin this message: Western sanctions against Russia are to blame for causing the shortages, and Ukraine is deliberately destroying grain supplies. Russia is now directing its disinformation at parts of the world where anti-Western sentiment is already strong, countries that include former colonies of the West-above all, in Africa. Moscow has not lost the information war so much as opened up new fronts in the fight elsewhere, away from Western eyes. That is now the received wisdom in the West.īut it is wrong. This contrasting split screen led many observers to declare that Russia had “lost” the information war. The images broadcast by the state news channel RT in the early weeks of the war seemed either clumsy in their denialism or flat-out deluded: Cheerful troops marching along and Ukrainians waving Russian flags pointed to a Potemkin military campaign. ![]() The lack of effort to sell the war abroad almost suggests that Moscow knew it would be pointless. The primary target of government communications has been the Russian people, the goal to legitimize Russian aggression and ready Russians for a world divorced from the West-with no more McDonald’s, Apple, or Netflix. Moscow has made little attempt-beyond some perfunctory statements about NATO expansion-to make its case to a foreign audience. If Ukraine’s effort in the information war has been a triumph, Russia’s has seemed almost as lackluster as the performance of its tank regiments. The campaign is built around Ukraine’s charismatic leader, President Volodymyr Zelensky, who, for a time in March and April, had a solid claim to being the most admired man in the West. Ukraine has rallied international support and attracted almost universal sympathy from European and North American users across the major social-media platforms.Īll of the country’s official social-media accounts have synchronized to push the same narrative of brave Ukrainians holding out against the brutal Russian invaders-a message that is, of course, essentially true. Since then, their progress in the online conflict has seemed-to Western observers, at least- unstoppable. Poor defensive tactics of the Syrian forces, IAF (Israeli Air Force) superiority and also an Israeli threat of a nuclear strike on Syria were pointed out by different analysts to be the causes of the Syrian defeat.When Russia invaded Ukraine on February 24, Kyiv’s digital information war sprang immediately to life. The Israeli forces lost 60-80 tanks while the Syrian forces lost total over 500 vehicles including 260 to 300 tanks. ![]() The Syrian forces withdrew on the Fourth day. The Israeli Air Force also took part in action. ![]() However, Israeli forces received reinforcement within just 15 hours after the battle started. The Syrian war planners expected an Israeli reinforcement after at least 1 day. Though the Syrians gained much ground during the first offensive of the battle, they failed to move their tanks across the Israeli anti-tank ditches. Israeli forces initially managed to deploy only 176 tanks. The Syrian forces started the offensive and 100 aircraft also took part in a Syrian airstrike. 400 of the Syrian tanks were T-62s, the most modern Soviet tanks during that time. The Syrian forces were backed up by 900 more tanks and the total Syrian tank participation in the battle is estimated to be 1260. Syria deployed 1 infantry division with around 500 tanks and vehicles while the Israel engaged 1 armored brigade with around 100 tanks.
0 Comments
Leave a Reply. |
AuthorWrite something about yourself. No need to be fancy, just an overview. ArchivesCategories |